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The British Empire in India, the Gulf Pearl and the Making of the Middle East 
 
A number of studies have attempted to trace the first uses of the term ‘Middle East’ and 
attribute its authorship to specific individuals.1 As early as 1883, Harper’s Bazaar mentioned 
the ‘dry Middle East’, the expression referring to those territories where the Arabs and 
Persians lived.2 On 9 July 1898, a Quaker from Pennsylvania declared he had ended up going 
‘into the Middle East among the Afghans’.3 Despite these early testimonies, General T. E. 
Gordon is often credited with being the inventor of the Middle East, on the basis of what he 
wrote in March 1900 in the journal The Nineteenth Century: ‘It may be assumed that the most 
sensitive part of our external policy in the Middle East is the preservation of the independence 
and integrity of Persia and Afghanistan.’4 Yet other voices also participated in the following 
years in this process of semantic creation, for example those of Alfred Mahan or of the 
journalist Valentine Chirol, who in 1902 and 1903 both provided definitions of this 
expression, albeit divergent ones.5 
Nevertheless, when one thinks about the question of the origin of the Middle East, it is 
not possible to be satisfied with simply putting a name and a date on a concept with a 
complex history, as if it were enough for a term to appear and name a reality in order for its 
history to begin. In reaction to this kind of approach, the goal of this article is to bring to light 
a key dimension of the history of this concept of the Middle East, by taking into consideration 
the political and geographical contexts which presided over the recourse to this term, still 
mostly unheard of at the beginning of the twentieth century. Thus, this article sheds light on 
the spatial invention of the Middle East over a long period of time, and not just the invention 
of the expression ‘the Middle East’. Indeed, the aim of this article is to establish that the 
lexical invention was only a means in making sense of the political and spatial implications of 
a very long process which had begun at the end of the eighteenth century, namely the 
informal imperialism of British India in the Gulf and its hinterlands, that is a space the limits 
of which fluctuated, but which had been considered since the 1780s by India as an area that 
could potentially protect the empire on its western flank. 
These brief introductory remarks demonstrate that historians, for decades, have only 
superficially explored a series of nevertheless major issues.6 How was the Middle East created 
even before it came to be a conceptual production? By whom, why and how? Drawing largely 
on sources of the Indian and British colonial governments, this article attempts to answer 
these questions by arguing that the Arabo-Persian Gulf and the areas neighbouring it played a 
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fundamental part in this gestation. Hence in order to explain this process, this article explores 
the nature of the imperialism set up by the expansively minded Indian empire in this region. 
More specifically, it focuses on the policies carried out throughout the nineteenth century with 
regard to the Gulf pearl fisheries, the main economic activity for the populations in this area.7 
These policies played a central role in the transformation of the Gulf into a pacified margin, a 
buffer zone, the function of which was to protect India on its Western flank. This article 
contends that as early as the beginning of the nineteenth century, the policies linked to Gulf 
pearls, replaced within the wider context of the existence and expansion of a world-wide 
economy of natural pearls, constituted a key tool in founding and strengthening the informal 
Indian empire in the Gulf and its hinterlands, in that very space to which the name ‘Middle 
East’ was given around 1902.  
Moreover, this kind of dynamics between the Gulf pearl and British-Indian 
imperialism opens the way to a whole new field of investigation bearing on the links between 
empire, globalization and global commodities. This article also raises the question of whether 
or not, when it comes to the long nineteenth century, it is legitimate to speak of a global 
empire of pearls, structured by the trade flows and networks pertaining to this commodity. 
Pearls were not a mass commodity and remained a luxury product until the beginning of the 
twentieth century and the invention of cultured pearls. Yet during the nineteenth century, 
there was a pearl boom related to a rise in world demand owing to the taste for this particular 
commodity among western societies.8 Thus, in the nineteenth century, a global market for 
natural pearls developed, the heart of which was the Arabo-Persian Gulf. In these waters, 
pearls known for their high quality were harvested mainly in order to supply world markets. 
Yet, the Gulf pearl boom was also stimulated by a particular context, the existence of a 
deliberate imperial strategy centred around pearls. This article accordingly brings together the 
threads of two stories that are generally seen as separate: the expansion of the British Indian 
empire in the Indian Ocean world and the globalization of the Gulf pearl. 
Moreover, the policies implemented by India in regard to pearls reveal a paradox 
which ought to be emphasized. Indeed, research focusing on commodities have analyzed how 
cotton or tea empires, for example, were organized along a double scale, each one 
corresponding to a different meaning of the word ‘empire’.9 The first was global and 
conferred a global dimension upon the word empire. Cotton and tea had empires transcending 
the borders of different political organizations or even of different empires. But there were 
also small regional empires, completely organized economically and politically around the 
exploitation and production of one of these commodities and integrated into the structure of 
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the world economy. Historiography has highlighted how these two types of imperial systems 
were united by a single purpose: economic profit generated by the exploitation, production 
and marketing of these commodities.10 
Indeed, the analysis of this tension within the historiography can be refined and 
revisited in the light of the case study of the Gulf pearl. The system devised by the Indian 
empire around Gulf pearls had a specific goal: ensuring peace on one of the most strategic 
buffer zones of this expansively-minded empire. There was thus an objective alternative to the 
mainly economic aim; pearls provided a tool to affirm and promote imperialism.  
This article begins by reviewing the way in which during the eighteenth century the 
Gulf progressively came under British control. Two distinct agents sometimes collaborated 
and were sometimes in a position of rivalry: London, on the one hand, and the various semi-
autonomous governments of India on the other, the Presidencies first, then the Government of 
India from 1858 on. This first part also examines the threats against which British India 
sought a barrier in the Gulf: France, the Ottomans and to a certain extent Russia. This 
overview will allow for an investigation of the scope and nature of the informal imperialism 
of London and of India in these territories, as well as its implications for local populations. 
The second part analyses the beginning of pearl policy in the Gulf and how the British 
takeover was articulated around the control of this commodity. The last section highlights the 
developments taking place at the end of the nineteenth century. During the time of the pearl 
boom, even though the production of Gulf pearls rose sharply, the greatest profit for London 
and India of this positive situation was not only economic in nature, but mainly political. The 
Gulf area, devoted mainly to harvesting pearl beds, had one key function as a strategic buffer 
zone: to protect the independent Indian empire on its western flank. 
 
Inventing a buffer zone: India and the Gulf at the beginning of the nineteenth century 
 
In order to understand the history of the Gulf at the beginning of the nineteenth century, it is 
necessary to take into account an important phenomenon affecting the world of the Indian 
ocean: the rise of India as a major geopolitical actor. Indeed, at the end of the eighteenth 
century, India formed an entity which was truly autonomous, or semi-autonomous, from 
London, carrying out its own policies on the subcontinent, in South and South-East Asia and 
in the Indian Ocean.11 From the early days of the East India Company (EIC) through to at 
least the 1920s, Britain’s Indian colonies maintained a semi-independent empire of their own. 
This ‘vast sphere of influence’, this ‘wide arc of territories’ built from the eighteenth century 
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on, stretched at the end of the nineteenth century from the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf to the 
China Sea and included territories going from East Africa to the Malaysian Peninsula.12 This 
empire, at first administered by the structures created by the EIC, particularly the 
Presidencies, then by the Government of India after 1858, had well-defined political 
priorities, which at times gave rise to tension with London. At the end of the eighteenth 
century, the Gulf was hit by the wave of Indian sub-imperialism that engulfed the Indian 
Ocean World. Admittedly, the EIC was already present in this area in the seventeenth century, 
through agencies and factories, that is trading posts set up between 1610 and 1630 in Ottoman 
Iraq, Persia and on the Gulf shores. As early as the seventeenth century, there was a hierarchy 
among these various trading posts, which was modified several times because of geopolitical 
disruption affecting the Gulf. These different agencies were administered by a Residency 
controlling all of the activities of the EIC and which received its orders from the Bombay 
Presidency. At the end of the eighteenth century, it was the Residency of Bushire, situated on 
the Persian shore, that was at the head of this network of factories and agencies. The Resident 
of Bushire was thus a key figure in the functioning of EIC activities in the Gulf.13 
Until the late eighteenth century, the Gulf was a periphery for the two main political 
powers of the region, the Ottoman and Qajar empires. The political influence of the Wahhabi 
state, centred on the Najd in the Arabian Peninsula, extended to the southern shores of the 
Gulf, with Ras el Khymah being a maritime satellite state of this rising power.14 At the end of 
the eighteenth century, Ras el Khymah had established a stronghold on Sharjah and on Lingah 
and smaller port cities on the Persian littoral. The numerous small independent Arab trading 
states arrayed along the southern fringes of the Gulf were independent, as the authority of the 
Ottoman empire had vanished in this area as in most of the Arabian Peninsula. The eighteenth 
century had seen the rise of the Sultanate of Oman and Zanzibar governed by the Āl Bū Saʿīd 
dynasty, who exerted a strong political and economic influence in the Gulf, the western Indian 
Ocean World and on eastern African shores.15 Around 1800, these different political entities 
competed for the control of the shores and islands of the Gulf. People in Kuwait, Bahrain, Ras 
el Khymah and other Gulf port cities enjoyed strong economic connections with merchant 
communities of the Indian Ocean World, based in India, East Africa, Zanzibar, Madagascar 
and Mauritius. The monsoon wind system allowed these links to develop, and the Gulf trade 
in dried fish, shark fins and skins, dates and pearls to flourish. Besides trade, pearl fishing was 
the main economic activity of Gulf people.16 
Nevertheless, at the end of the eighteenth century, the political and economic 
importance of the Gulf for India was very limited, and the trade of the Company in the area 
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was relatively insignificant.17 Yet, the situation changed precisely in this period, and the Gulf 
and its neighbouring areas, because of a particular context, became an object of renewed 
interest for India.18 While the consequences of the Revolutionary Wars were being felt in the 
Indian Ocean World, Britain’s Indian colonies began to fear an invasion of India by France. 
After 1798 and the French campaign in Egypt, rumours spread in India of a project by 
Napoleon to establish a foothold on the subcontinent with the support of the Tsar, but also of 
regional powers from West Asia and the Indian ocean, such as the Shah of Persia and the 
Sultan of Oman. Napoleon’s project on India was seen as a revival of Dupleix’s dream to 
create a French India and to challenge the expansion of the EIC in the subcontinent. 
According to these rumours, weaving together reality and fiction and spreading throughout 
the subcontinent, as early as the end of the 1790s, in order to carry out his invasion plans, 
Napoleon had been attempting to form an alliance with the Sultan of Muscat and the Shah of 
Persia through diplomatic missions and the signature of various agreements. In Bushire and 
Bombay, there was a mood of panic reinforced by Napoleon’s military ventures. Rumours 
spread of plans for a landing in India of the French army, which would be transported from 
Egypt and the Red Sea and backed by troops stationed in the French islands in the Indian 
Ocean. After 1803 and the failure of the Treaty of Amiens, the threat was embodied by the 
Grande Armée, which led by Napoleon, was reputed to have been on the brink of advancing 
on British possessions in India, with the logistical support of the Shah of Persia.19 For 
Bombay and Bushire, at a time when the French threat looked genuine and India seemed to be 
at the mercy of the ‘trouble-maker of Europe’, the Gulf was of key importance: it was truly 
the access corridor to India, and therein lay the danger. 
The maritime and territorial zone situated on the western flank of India thus 
represented a threat in India’s imagination. Another fear was added to that of having 
Napoleon establish a foothold in the Gulf, since the region also seemed dangerous and 
threatening in another way. India imagined it as a vast earthly inferno, burnt by a hellish sun 
and populated by those troubling creatures, pirates. Indeed, as early as the end of the 
eighteenth century, when India thought it was at the mercy of Napoleon, a complex discourse 
depicting the Gulf as a haven for pirates was being developed in Bombay and Bushire.20 The 
Gulf populations were thus accused of attacking the ships of the EIC cruising in the Gulf and 
in the straits of Hormuz, of disrupting Indian trade and more generally of being ‘enemies of 
mankind’, disturbing the peace at sea and being detrimental to free maritime movement.21 In 
the late 1750s, Bombay had made similar accusations against the seafaring and maritime 
communities living on the shores stretching between Kathiawar Peninsula and the Gulf of 
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Cutch, in order to justify military interventions against the small states arrayed on these coasts 
and the political expansion of the Presidency in the Indian Ocean World.22 A whole range of 
negative representations became associated with the Gulf coastal societies, combining 
ideological considerations about race and Islam, but also a negative geographical determinism 
and a certain wariness of nomadism.23 The maritime and coastal space of the Gulf, with the 
rugged coastline of Ras Musandam plunging into the waters of the straits of Hormuz, the 
many islands and sandbanks, the numerous lagoons, was thought to be the source of pirate 
violence.24 In a way, the place and its very wildness determined the people. The part of the 
coast stretching from Bahrain to the straits of Hormuz was then called ‘the Pirate Coast’.25 
The Qasimi, likened to genuine ‘barbarians’ and to Jihad fanatics allied with the first Saudi 
Wahhabi state, were the more particular object of the stigmatization carried out by Bombay.26 
They were thus accused of being the armed wing on the sea of the most radical Islam.27 The 
caricature of the Qasimi and British-Indian discourse on the Gulf populations centred around 
a certain number of acts of piracy which took place between 1802 and 1808. Two particularly 
violent and spectacular attacks occurred in 1808, one in the spring and the other in the 
autumn. The crews of two ships flying the British flag, the Shannon and the Minerva, were 
put to death by Gulf pirates.28 Why were the Qasimi especially targeted by this rhetoric from 
Bombay? And above all, were they really pirates? 29 Rather than a single tribe, the Qasimi 
formed a group of allied tribes, some of them living on the Arab bank, some on the Persian 
bank. The centre of their power was situated in Ras al Khaimah and it was thus on this port 
that the British targeted their attacks.30 
For India, a question arose within this context: how to transform the Gulf, a 
threatening space in more ways than one and a haven for pirates, into a possible buffer zone 
that might be able to protect India on its western flank? How might the Pirate Coast and the 
Gulf be transformed into a pacified space? The first response was a large-scale deployment of 
violence, justified by the pirate threat personified in the Qasimi and other Gulf tribes. It took 
the form of assaults against the city of Ras al Khaimah and other allied or dependent 
strongholds which had been set up on both sides of the straits of Hormuz. This unequal 
violence translated in 1809 and 1819 into two bombings of the city by EIC ships, but also into 
punitive raids against the ports of the Persian shore, the populations of which had pledged 
allegiance to the Qasimi.31 These two interventions organized by the Bombay Presidency 
were decisive on a number of counts. They reduced considerably, or even perhaps annihilated 
the emerging power of Ras al Khaimah, which witnessed the almost total destruction of its 
fleet. And above all, they established a monopoly on violence in the Gulf, which for the rest 
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of the long nineteenth century would lie with the British. Other means were later employed to 
transform the Gulf into a pacified margin integrated into the territorial system protecting 
India. New threats were alleged throughout the nineteenth century to justify an ever more 
visible presence. Hence, the French danger to India was followed as early as 1820 by the 
Russian threat, which in turn was replaced around 1880 by what was thought to be the great 
risk represented by the imperialism of the Sublime Porte allied with Germany. One can 
consider therefore that it was the existence of repeated threats to India, no doubt as much real 
as imagined, and the existence or designation of enemies representing a danger for the 
security and territorial integrity of this empire, expanding throughout the nineteenth century, 
which motivated Indian imperialism in the Gulf. These anxieties of empire played a central 
role in the transformation of this area into a buffer zone, the function of which was to protect 
the western flank of an evolving, and anxiety-ridden, Indian empire. 
Among the means used to pacify the Gulf and transform its geopolitical situation, the 
survey campaigns to map the Gulf and its shores played a key role. They were organised by 
India and London as early as the 1820s. They opened the way to a wide-ranging process of 
reconnaissance of the area, and above all, to the making of maps. Parallel to military 
operations, these surveys, campaigns and expeditions made it possible to take possession of 
the space through the formation of geographical knowledge and the simultaneous process of 
imposing a new order upon cartographical language. At first, it was the south of the Gulf 
which was the object of reconnaissance, from 1820 to around 1828. A second wave of 
surveys took place from 1835 to around the end of the 1860s, of which the main setting was 
what the British themselves called ‘Lower Mesopotamia’. The third was begun in 1870 and 
ended on the eve of the First World War. It concerned mainly the ‘Upper Gulf’, that is, the 
regions situated north of Bahrain, the lower Shatt-el-Arab region as well as the Persian 
coast.32  
To military violence and survey campaigns were added other instruments for pacifying 
and taking control of the Gulf space: the establishment of naval patrols and the reinforcement 
of the role of the Resident, which became much more political as early as the 1820s.33 A 
representative of the Bombay Presidency in the Gulf, the Resident was really one of the 
artisans of a policy of peacekeeping and change in the Gulf.34 There was also a second type of 
response, one of pacification and transformation of the space and its inhabitants through the 
promotion of legal activities, especially trade, replacing piracy and various trafficking deemed 
to be illegal and outlawed by the British.35 It was in this context that the British set up a policy 
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centred on pearl fishing and trading, in order to transform the Gulf and to convert its 
populations from being ‘a lawless predatory race of robbers’ into ‘useful subjects’.36  
 
Pirates, tribes and treaties: Inventing India’s pearl policy in the Gulf 
 
A specific diplomatic context presided over the implementation of India’s pearl policy. In the 
wake of the second expedition against Ras al Khaimah, preliminary treaties were signed with 
several sheikhs from the Pirate Coast. Then a ‘General Treaty’ was concluded between all of 
the sheikhs and British India.37 These treaties set up a new order, both on the shores and at 
sea. They called for the destruction of what was left of the old order, such as the fortifications 
of Ras al Khaimah and the remnants of the Qasimi war fleet.38 The slave trade, illegal 
trafficking, and violence on the sea were assimilated to piracy.39 Trade and ‘legal’ activities 
liable to bring about prosperity were to replace ‘lawless and predatory habits’.40  
Nevertheless, it was pearling that was truly at the core of the Preliminary Treaties of 
1819 and of the General Treaty of 1820. In several of the Preliminary Treaties, it was 
demanded that the ‘Arab tribes’41 give up to the British all of their fleets, with the exception 
of the boats used for pearl fishing.42 These articles were meant to keep the tribes from 
rebuilding fleets other than those specialized in pearl fishing. The goal of these articles was to 
stabilize their presence at sea within the strict limits of solely pearl harvesting as a 
monoculture. Several clauses of the General Treaty reinforced these measures, demanding 
that pearling dhows be in possession of a register and a port clearance.43 Four years later a 
decision, issued directly from Bombay in this instance, came to complete the crucial step 
taken with the Preliminary Treaty. In May 1823, in order to step up the surveillance of Gulf 
waters during the pearl-diving season, regular sea patrols were organized. By decision of the 
Governor of Bombay, M. Elphinstone, a Gulf Squadron was set up, endowed with six cruisers 
and placed under the orders of the Senior Maritime Officer. Its main mission was to cruise the 
pearl beds from May to November and to make sure the fishing went smoothly. 
During the 1820s, critical voices were heard both in Bushire and Bombay, denouncing 
a partial failure of the General Treaty and of this first phase in pearl legislation.44 According 
to Bushire, the feuds existing between the different Gulf tribes generated a climate of violence 
in the Gulf waters which disturbed the peace at sea, and above all was highly detrimental to 
pearl fishing.45 In 1835, proposals came out of Bushire to find solutions to the deficiencies of 
the General Treaty. It appears indeed that in that year the pearl harvest had not been very 
satisfactory, due to several conflicts among various tribal groups, according to Bushire, and 
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notably to tension between the sheikhs of Ajman and Abu Dhabi on one hand, and the Sultan 
of Oman on the other.46 The Resident of Bushire, S. Hennel, suggested a new system intended 
to regulate the relations among the sheikhs and to increase the authority of the Resident of 
Bushire, the ‘maritime truces’. As in the case of the Preliminary Treaties and of the General 
Treaty, pearl fishing was at the heart of the new order which the maritime truces were meant 
to establish. The first goal was to guarantee the peace at sea in the Gulf for six months, that is, 
during the pearling season, in order to ensure that the latter would take place without 
disruption. Pearl fishing was thus meant to contribute at the same time to shaping the peace at 
sea and prosperity, both of them being seen as protecting peace on the buffer zone. An initial 
maritime truce was signed in 1835 by the sheikhs of the Pirate Coast.47  By virtue of this 
agreement, peace was to reign upon the seas, significantly from 21 May to 21 November 1835 
during the high season of pearl fishing. Breaking this agreement in any way was assimilated 
to piracy. In the case of aggression or recourse to violence, the members of the tribe of one of 
the signatory sheikhs pledged not to respond, but to report the incident immediately to the 
Resident who was to act as a ‘mediator’. From 1835 and until 1843, the temporary maritime 
truces were renewed every year, for the duration of the pearl season. To make sure the Truces 
were being respected, maritime surveillance of the pearl beds was reinforced. Thus, from 
1840, two cruisers from the Gulf Squadron were posted permanently on the pearl beds from 
April to November.48 The temporary maritime truces were thus an instrument to reinforce the 
authority of the key figure of the informal empire in the Gulf, the Resident. Indeed, as early as 
1835, the main mission of the Resident during his yearly tour of the Gulf was to visit the 
various sheikhs so that they would agree to the renewal of the Truce. 
In 1841, the commander of the Persian Gulf Squadron declared himself pleased with 
the efficiency of the Truces and the smooth running of the pearl season. According to G. B. 
Brucks, from 30,000 to 40,000 men, spread over a fleet of approximately 2500 boats, had kept 
busy fishing pearls between April and October 1841, in a climate that was said to be 
‘peaceful’.49 In 1843, Bombay came out in favour of a new treaty with the sheikhs, on the 
model of the temporary truces, but this time around meant to last longer, that is ten years.50 
This new maritime truce was concluded in 1843, with several articles recognizing the harmful 
economic effects on pearl fishing of the rivalry between sheikhs and of violent attacks at 
sea.51 Ten years later, in 1853, the sheikhs of the Pirate Coast signed the ‘Treaty of Maritime 
Peace in Perpetuity’ which marked the birth of the ‘Trucial Coast’ and the disappearance of 
the ‘Pirate Coast’. They declared that they renounced any form of violence at sea ‘for 
evermore’ and not just during the pearling season.52 Bahrain was associated with this 
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agreement in 1861. In the 1880s and 1890s, the system of treaties was completed by other 
agreements, the ‘exclusive treaties’ by which Bahrain in 1880, the various States of the 
Trucial Coast in 1892 and Kuwait in 1899 agreed to maintain relations only with Great 
Britain and to ban any foreign interference in their territories.53 Qatar signed the Treaty of 
Maritime Peace in Perpetuity and the Exclusive agreement only in 1916, since the Sublime 
Porte had kept its sovereignty over this area until 1913.54 
From 1820 to around 1860, what has been identified as the first phase of pearling 
legislation was an integral part of the vast imperial plan of India for West Asia: the 
transformation of the Gulf into a buffer zone. By means of the pearling policy, the point was 
to firmly establish the authority of India over this space, to discipline the Gulf populations and 
to institute the peace at sea. As an essential component of the Pax Britannica, pearling 
legislation made it possible to define the spatial and legal shape of the buffer zone, organized 
around pearl beds, around the sea and along a thin coastal strip over which the sheikhs’ 
authority was exerted at various points. 
Beginning in the 1870s, the second phase of pearling legislation was launched in a 
context in which, with the intensification of the global pearl boom, pearl beds, having been 
overexploited in response to global demand, became the object of attempts to modernize 
fishing techniques or to obtain concessions for foreigners to fish pearls. In an analysis of this 
second stage, this last section demonstrates how yet again India, through its protection of Gulf 
pearls in this new age of pearl imperialism, remained focused as always on the preservation of 
peace on its strategic buffer zone.  
 
India and the globalization of the Gulf pearl: protecting the ‘pacification’ of the buffer 
zone 
As early as the 1820s, there was a sudden surge in the enthusiasm for pearls in Europe and in 
the United States, a surge maintained within the context of the Industrial Revolution thanks to 
the rise of a global bourgeoisie with its own codes of appearance.55 Pearls were thus 
considered to be an indispensable fashion accessory for these new social groups, for their 
‘distinction’, for the link they established between what they defined as a ‘legitimate taste’ – 
to quote Pierre Bourdieu – and the assertion of their symbolic pre-eminence.56 According to 
the Parisian jeweller and gem broker Léonard Rosenthal, in the nineteenth century, ‘the pearl 
necklace became one of the surest warrants of bourgeois dignity’.57 The phenomenon of the 
taste for pearls took on an ostentatious dimension in jewels for women and tie pins for men 
for example.58 Other accessories, such as buttons and marquetry, stimulated the demand for 
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mother-of-pearl and for pearls.59 The demand from regional markets – India above all, the 
Ottoman and Persian empires to a lesser extent – was not drying up, but it was not in any way 
comparable to European demand. 
As a consequence of this fashion in Europe and the United States, the nineteenth 
century was a period of worldwide growth of the exportation of Gulf pearls. Over the seventy 
years from 1830 to ca. 1900, taking the Gulf as a whole, the value of pearl exports was 
multiplied by five: indeed, exports amounted to £300,000 in 1833; £400,000 in 1866; and 
£1,434,399 in 1905. It is estimated that between 1873 and 1905, the value of pearl exports 
doubled.60 Within this economic context of a rise in exports, the price of pearls also rose, 
doubling between 1852 and 1878. The pearl boom reached a peak between 1900 and 1912. In 
Bahrain, exports were multiplied by six during this period. A strong European demand 
accounts for most of this simultaneous rise of exportation and prices beginning in the 1830s, 
but it was also a result of irregularities, or even crises, in the production of the other fisheries 
traditionally supplying Europe. Thus, in the middle of the nineteenth century, there was a 
temporary decrease in the production of the fisheries of Ceylon or of the Red Sea, which left 
Gulf pearls in a situation of dominance on various markets, at times for several years in a 
row.61 It can be estimated that from 1860 to 1914, more than half of all the pearls supplied to 
world markets, and over 80 per cent of natural pearls, came from the Gulf. In 1906, Gulf 
pearls made up 49 per cent of the worldwide production of pearls.62 
The pearl boom had a major geographical, social and economic impact on the Gulf. 
The main socio-economic consequence of this intensified harvesting of pearl beds, however, 
was an increase in the indebtedness of local populations, and this phenomenon attracted the 
attention of the Government of India. For pearl fishing on the Arab coast of the Gulf was 
based on a permanent system of loans at every level, largely controlled by Indian merchant 
communities, Kacchi Hindu Bhatias and Muslim Khojas based mostly in Muscat.63 
Before the beginning of the pearl season, and in order to fit out ships, and to buy 
material and supplies, the boat captains, the nakhodas, borrowed money from two categories 
of lender.64 The first category was made up of Indian merchants who were very active in the 
Bombay pearl market.65 In the second group, one found pawnbrokers, mostly Banyan traders. 
The role of these two groups in the financing of pearl fishing tended to decrease at the end of 
the nineteenth century, and they were replaced by Arab merchants. The lenders reimbursed 
themselves at the end of the season by buying the ‘harvest’ at a price 15 to 20 per cent under 
market price. Another option was for the nakhoda to choose to sell the pearls to a merchant 
and then pay back his debts to the lender – indeed this was the most frequent case. If the 
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nakhoda was not able to reimburse the pawnbroker after having sold his pearls to a merchant, 
the merchant then became responsible for the nakhoda’s debts. Given the fluctuations of the 
world pearl market and the irregularity of the harvests, the nakhodas frequently found 
themselves unable to pay their debts and might thus get into debt for many years, sometimes 
even for life. If a nakhoda was the owner of his ship, sometimes the pawnbroker would 
demand that the debtor sell his boat to pay back his debt. It may be noted that a nakhoda in 
debt to a pawnbroker could manage to escape the influence of the latter, by going and 
concluding a deal with another pawnbroker who would accept to buy back his debt. Such 
arrangements also existed for fishermen who were in debt; they would have their debts bought 
back by a nakhoda. Fishermen and crew members indeed borrowed from the captain to 
purchase what they needed to survive once the pearl season had ended and could thus fall 
victim to this same cycle of indebtedness. 
In the 1860s and 1870s, the British began to worry about the social effects of this 
endemic indebtedness, such as the rising number on the Pearl Coast of ‘runaway debtors’, that 
is, individuals who were so far in debt they could no longer borrow and were thus seeking 
refuge in another territory in order to continue to borrow and be able to fish. For a sheikh, 
granting asylum to a runaway debtor was seen as an important political gesture and a 
challenge to the authority of a neighbouring sheikh.66 In the 1870s, conflicts and outbreaks of 
violence called in some cases for the intervention of the Resident.67 India and its 
representative in Bushire, Edward C. Ross rapidly came to see the existence of these runaway 
debtors as a threat to the peace at sea and to the political and socio-economic balance of this 
buffer zone of the Indian empire: ‘The maintenance of peace and friendly relations amongst 
the chiefs and people of Oman will lead to the prosperity of the country’.  The debtors were 
thus described as ‘a cause of strife and dispute’ and ‘a risk of the breach of peace at sea’.68 In 
1878, following up on a request by the sheikhs of Ajman and of Umm Al Quwain, Ross 
declared running away in the case of debts to be illegal.69 He demanded that all debtors return 
to their territories and jurisdiction of origin and settle their debts. While difficult to 
implement, this decision represented a step toward the signature of a treaty in 1879 with the 
sheikhs of the Pearl Coast, the ‘Mutual Agreement Entered into by the Trucial Coast Rulers 
about Absconding Debtors’.70 The existence of runaway debtors was in all likelihood an 
ancient and structurally important indicator in the Gulf pearl industry, on the model of what 
occurred in all of the societies in the Indian Ocean.71 Yet the phenomenon increased in the 
1870s no doubt due to the world pearl boom. Nevertheless, it is possible to wonder about the 
consequences it generated. The representative of the Government of India in the Gulf kept 
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explaining that these debtors brought about tension and violence. As a matter of fact, these 
accusations, like those which had been formulated earlier against piracy, served a purpose 
manifest in the exclusive treaties of the 1880s and 1890s: the reinforcement of the authority of 
India in the Gulf and therefore an even more assertive construction than before of a buffer 
zone. Indeed, by virtue of the agreement of 1879, the sheikhs agreed to refuse asylum to any 
runaway debtor and to help him return to his jurisdiction of origin.72 If a runaway debtor was 
found on the territory of a sheikh, the latter ran the risk of being fined MT (Maria Theresa 
Thaler) 50. The fine could be doubled if it was found that a sheikh actively protected a debtor, 
thus assisting him in contracting new debts. If a sheikh refused to submit to the rules set by 
this agreement, the final decision went to the British Resident. 
Another consequence at the level of the Gulf of this world enthusiasm for pearls was 
the arrival in the 1880s and 1890s of foreign companies and adventurers bent on making a 
fortune in pearl fishing and trade. Two groups may be distinguished here. The first to appear 
were foreign merchants, often jewellers or gem-brokers wishing to buy pearls directly from 
local tradesmen or fishermen. Secondly, there were companies attempting to develop pearl 
harvesting using modern techniques. As for the first group, Parisian jewellers stood as 
pioneers. At the close of the nineteenth century, Paris, with the jewellers from the place 
Vendôme, established itself from this time on as the world capital of pearl brokerage, to the 
detriment of Bombay. The rise of Paris as the European capital of the pearl was a 
consequence of the US stock exchange panic of October 1907. Indeed, from late 1907, British 
creditors based in Bombay who used to give credit to Indian pearls merchants of this port city 
specialized in the trade of Gulf pearls, asked for the repayment of their debts. Pearl merchants 
from London, Vienna and mostly Paris saw in this transformation of the Bombay pearl-
purchasing system a major opportunity to capture the Gulf pearl’s trade. The temporary 
withdrawal of Bombay pearl merchants from the trade resulted in a shift of the centre of the 
global pearl market to Paris at the end of the nineteenth century. Paris remained the capital of 
the pearl until the late 1920s. Another consequence of the withdrawal of British creditors 
from the Bombay pearl market was that Indian merchants partly stopped acting as 
intermediaries in the global pearl trade. Indeed, a Parisian pearl broker, Sigismund 
Ettinghausen, set up contacts with Bahrain as early as 1899.73 He was followed by the 
Rosenthal brothers, Léonard and Victor, who benefitted from the economic downturn 
affecting the pearling industry in the Gulf in the wake of the 1907 stock-market crisis.74 
During the year 1909, V. Rosenthal spent thirteen weeks in Bahrain and bought 1,300,000 
rupees worth of pearls, that is approximately 25 per cent of the total Gulf stock.75 The 
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following year, 36 per cent of the production was acquired by Rosenthal & Frères, for 
4,000,000 rupees. This presence of French jewellers culminated with the admittedly brief visit 
of Jacques Cartier to Bahrain in the summer of 1912.76 In 1911, the house of Rosenthal & 
Frères attempted to obtain a concession from one of the sheikhs, a clear sign of the actually 
competitive activism of some European companies.77 The presence of Rosenthal & Frères and 
Ettinghausen seeking to buy Gulf pearls is not just only an evidence of the globalization of the 
Gulf pearls at the end of the nineteenth century. Their adventures in the Gulf are also a 
reminder that from the late 1880s, Jewish jewellers and brokers acquired a growing 
importance at the European end of the pearl trade, especially in Paris, but also to a lesser 
extent, in London. Parisian Jewish brokers and jewellers made fortunes in the Gulf pearl trade 
and became at the beginning of the twentieth century distinguished members of the Parisian 
bourgeoisie.78  
From as early as the 1890s, some companies opened branches in the Gulf, which in 
turn took part in commercial development projects with European partners. This was the case 
with the German company Wönckhaus, specialized in the pearl and mother-of-pearl trade 
with Germany. In 1897, R. Wonckhaüs set up in Lingah the first branch of the ‘Perlen 
Compagnie Wönckhaus GmbH’, which in 1909 also had agencies in Bahrain, Bandar Abbas, 
Dubai and Sharjah.79 
The activities of these jewellers and adventurers did not overly worry the Government 
of India. However, the attempts at intensive harvesting of the pearl beds were a cause for 
alarm for both India and Bushire, and led them to pass laws to protect this essential resource, 
in accordance with the standard case made to legitimize their control apparatus, as well to 
maintain the existence of the resource. Indeed, attempts to introduce ‘modern’ fishing 
methods occurred in Bahrain as early as the 1860s and they aroused immediate anxiety among 
the Bahraini fishermen.80 These cases seem to have multiplied between 1890 and 1910.81 In 
1900, a British Indian merchant established in Muscat thus managed to obtain directly from 
the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi the authorization to position on the beds two divers equipped with 
diving suits. For Bushire, the problem was that the Government of India had no legal means 
to prevent and ban this type of intervention and to protect pearl beds from over-exploitation, 
even though they were described as ‘the common property of the coast Arabs’.82 The question 
was submitted to the Crown jurists by the India Office in 1904, ‘upon the legal and 
international points raised by his Excellency’s Government’. In the memorandum delivered to 
the jurists, it was emphasized that the creation of a legislation relative to the fisheries was part 
of the policy of preservation of peace in the Gulf, India’s western buffer zone: 
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The Government of India have called the attention of His Majesty’s Government (…) 
to the fact that in the steps they have consistently taken for more than a century to 
maintain the maritime peace of the Persian Gulf, they have deprived the Arab Chiefs 
on the coast of the means of forcibly protecting their interests in the pearl fisheries, 
and that they therefore feel themselves to be under an obligation to defend those rights 
in so far as they can reasonably be substantiated.83 
 
During the month of February 1905, the Crown jurists drafted two texts, one on the 
right of tribes over the pearl beds and the other concerning protection measures. The first 
document expressed the opinion that in the waters situated between the coast and three marine 
miles, called ‘territorial waters’, the ‘tribes of the Arabian coast’ enjoyed ‘the exclusive use’ 
of the beds. In the ‘territorial’ waters, therefore, the Arabs could demand to have the benefit 
of an exclusive fishing right. In consequence, ‘foreign’ societies or individuals could thus be 
excluded. In the ‘deep’ sea, beyond three marine miles, the right to exclusivity of the tribe 
could not be claimed. It was specified that the representatives of the Government of India in 
the Gulf had the authority to enforce the right of the Arabs in territorial waters. In the second 
document, the jurists recommended avoiding by ‘indirect means’ the intrusion of ‘foreigners’ 
even in the deep sea. If it came about that the prohibition on fishing was not respected, they 
indicated it was ‘admissible, in the case of the banks only, to effect the compulsory removal 
of the vessels’. This kind of action was only to be undertaken warily and only with the 
sheikhs’ agreement. Moreover, in case of a dispute, it was possible to bring before the Court 
in the Hague any problems having to do with territorial waters, keeping in mind at the same 
time that the outcome of such a procedure, which when all was said and done was not very 
advisable, could be uncertain. In order to guarantee the implementation of these measures, in 
1911, the Government of India, through the Resident of Bushire, made an agreement with the 
sheikhs of the Trucial Coast, of Bahrain and of Kuwait, according to which they could not 
grant concessions having to do with the pearl beds without asking the Resident.84 This 
agreement restated one last time that the attempts to develop modern fishing techniques 
would lead to the end of the political and economic prosperity which had been built up by 
India for more than a century: ‘In these days, possibly will come people seeking their own 
profits and from this profit will arrive loss to us and to our people.’ Above all, it was stated 
that it was not up to the sheikhs to exploit this resource: ‘I do not seek profit without your 
consultation.’85 Pearls were thus India’s asset, an imperial commodity from which the Indian 
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empire drew its greatest profit: peace, and by extension what was its primary goal, security on 
one of its most strategic buffer zones. 
 
Throughout the long nineteenth century, India thus invented a peculiar imperial model centred 
on a particular prize, Gulf pearls. What henceforth could be called the ‘pearl imperialism’ of 
India had as its goal the exploitation of Gulf pearls in order to gain a profit that went beyond 
the economic dimension and was instead first and foremost political. The Government of 
India, by promoting pearl exploitation beginning in the early decades of the nineteenth 
century, sought to perfect the apparatus it had set up as it intervened militarily and politically 
in the Gulf. The point was to settle and discipline the populations, to allow for the 
development of economic activity, and to gradually build up a legal framework meant to 
pacify and better control territories which had become eminently strategic since they were 
meant to be a buffer zone, a sort of western border of India. This policy was continued and 
systematized throughout the nineteenth century at the same time as this border became more 
important, and the Government of India, drawing inspiration from the experiments in 
governing undertaken in the sub-continent, relied on the sheikhs to carry it out. The demand 
for pearls, greatly increasing at the end of the nineteenth century, led western, non-British 
merchants to try and insert themselves into the commercialisation of this commodity. India 
endeavoured to react by limiting the intensive exploitation of the beds. Indeed, what was 
important was the preservation of this resource, which was essential to the stability of this 
buffer zone of the Indian empire. 
In light of these conclusions, it can thus be claimed that the field of enquiry relating to 
the history of the relationships between commodities and empires, and of their mutually 
reinforcing character, remains open. What India implemented in the Gulf was assuredly a 
political-economic model, with a global commodity at the heart of its operation, yet with a 
political objective the conceptualization of which cannot be dissociated from a series of 
deeply-felt anxieties linked to the fear of seeing the domination of India undermined. It can 
also be stated that the pearl paradigm does not quite function as the cotton paradigm studied 
by Sven Beckert does.86 Cotton operated within a system of absolute violence represented by 
the slave trade which was to provide available labour at a very low price. Pearls, 
paradoxically because they claim the lives of the divers while at the same time being a highly 
lucrative commodity, were associated in the way they were exploited with the struggle against 
the slave trade, so that they may appear as a means to reduce violence. 
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Whatever the case, it is still possible to wonder about the longevity of the imperial 
model created in the Gulf and about the durability of pearls as an imperial commodity. Signs 
of the depletion of the beds became apparent as early as the first decades of the twentieth 
century, even before two phenomena took place during the interwar period which precipitated 
the end of the cycle of pearls as imperial commodity. First of all, with the Great Depression 
the market for luxury goods collapsed, depriving pearls of their outlet in Europe and in the 
United States. Second, and more importantly, as early as the end of the 1920s, cultured pearls 
created by the Japanese inventor Mikimoto Kokichi took over the markets and displaced Gulf 
pearls. During the 1930s, outbreaks of violence increased, with notably the pearl riots in 
Bahrain. Nevertheless, precisely during those years after the First World War, an alternative 
imperial system was beginning to be invented, centred on another commodity, the importance 
of which would turn out to be political as well as economic: oil. Once again, through the 
control of a resource, the issue of the stability of a region essential to the functioning of the 
British imperial system was being raised. 
 
Notes 
1 On this kind of approach see, C.R. Koppes, ‘Captain Mahan, General Gordon, and the Origins of the 
Term “Middle East”’, Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 12, No.1, (1976), pp.95-98; K. Culcasi, ‘Constructing 
and naturalizing the Middle East’, Geographical Review Vol.100, No.4, (2010), pp.583-597. 
2 ‘Locusts and wild honey (...) and the Persians, Arabians, and other people of the dry Middle East have 
always included them, and do yet, in their bill of fare’, Harper's Bazaar Vol.16, No.10, (10 March 1883), 
p.154. 
3 The New York Times, 9 July 1898, p.26.  
4 T. E. Gordon, ‘The Problem of the Middle East’, The Nineteenth Century Vol.47, No. 277, (March 1900), 
p.413. 
5 V. Chirol, The Middle Eastern Question or Some Political Problems of Indian Defence (London: John 
Murray, 1903). The book is made up of articles published in the Times in 1902 and 1903. See also A. T. 
Mahan, ‘The Persian Gulf and International Relations’, National Review Vol.40 (September 1902), p.39, 
reprinted in A. T. Mahan, Retrospect and Prospect (Boston: Little, Brown, 1902), p.237. 
6 See for example, M. Bonine, A. Amanat and M. Gasper (eds), Is There a Middle East? The Evolution of a 
Geopolitical Concept (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012). 
7 On the economy of the Gulf and the importance of pearling, see F. Bishara, B. Haykel, S. Hertog, C. 
Holes and J. Onley, ‘The Traditional Economy of the Gulf’ in The Emergence of the Gulf States: Studies in 
Modern History, J. E. Peterson ed., (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016), pp.187-222; F. Heard-Bey, 
From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates: A Society in Transition (London: Longman, 1996), pp.202-7, 
250; M. S. Scott Hopper, Slaves of One Master: Globalization and Slavery in Arabia in the Age of Empire 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015), pp.80-104; D. A. Agius, Seafaring in the Arabian Gulf and 
Oman: People of the Dhow (London: Routledge, 2009), pp.143-154. 
8 X. Beguin Billecocq, Les Emirats ou la fabuleuse histoire de la Côte des Perles (Paris: Relations 
internationales & culture, 1995); R. Donkin., Beyond Price. Pearls and Pearl-Fishing: Origins to the Age 
of Discoveries (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1998); A. Farn, Pearls: Natural, Cultured 
and Imitation (Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1991); S. Malaguzzi, The Pearl (New York: Rizzoli, 
2001); R. Carter, Sea of Pearls: Seven Thousand Years of the Industry that Shaped the Gulf (London: 
Arabian Publishing, 2012); R. Le Baron Bowen, ‘The Pearl Fisheries of the Persian Gulf’, Middle East 
Journal Vol.5, No.2, (1951), pp.161-180. 
                                                 
 18 
                                                                                                                                                        
9 Within this abundant historiography, see, among others, S. Beckert, Empire of Cotton: A Global History 
(New York: Knopf, 2015); G. Riello, Cotton: The Fabric that Made the Modern World (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012); E. Rappaport, A Thirst for Empire: How Tea Shaped the Modern 
World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017); T. Brook and B. Tadashi Wakabayashi (eds), Opium 
Regimes: China, Britain and Japan, 1839-1952 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); D. 
Valenze Milk: A Global and Local History (Yale: New Heaven University Press, 2011); W. G.  Clarence-
Smith, Cocoa and Chocolate, 1765-1914 (London: Routledge, 2000); W. G. Clarence-Smith and S. Topik 
(eds), The Global Coffee Economy in Africa, Asia and Latin America, 1500-1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003). 
10 See for example Beckert, Empire of Cotton. 
11 For a general overview, see T. Metcalf, Imperial connections: India in the Indian Ocean Arena, 1860-
1920 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007); S. Bose, A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in 
the Age of Global Empire, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006; K. McPherson, S. Arasaratnam, H. 
Furber and S. Subrahmanyam (eds), Maritime India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); R. J. Blyth, 
The Empire of the Raj: India, Eastern Africa, and the Middle East, 1858–1947 (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003). 
12 Metcalf, Imperial Connections., pp.1, 6. 
13 J. Onley, The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj: Merchants, Rulers, and the British in the Nineteenth-
Century Gulf (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). For a general overview see also, J.B. Kelly, Britain 
and the Persian Gulf, 1795–1880 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968).  
14 On the history of the Wahhabi State, see M. Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
15 J. Jones and N. Ridout, A History of Modern Oman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), chap. 1 
and 2.  
16 F. Bishara, B. Haykel, S. Hertog C. Holes and J. Onley, ‘The Traditional Economy of the Gulf’, pp.187-
222. 
17 On this topic, see J. Peterson, ‘Britain and the Gulf: At the Periphery of Empire’, in The Persian Gulf in 
History (London: Macmillan, 2008), pp.277-294; C. E. Davies, The Blood-Red Arab Flag. An Investigation 
into Qasimi Piracy, 1797-1820 (Exeter: Exeter University Press, 1997), pp.5-11. 
18 On the strategic importance of the Gulf over the Red Sea, see E. Ingram, Commitment to Empire: 
Prophecies of the Great Game in Asia 1797-1800 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981). 
19 On this real and imaginary threat, see G. Crouzet, Genèses du Moyen-Orient. Le Golfe Persique à l’âge 
des impérialismes (c.1800-c.1914) (Ceyzérieux: Champ Vallon, 2015), pp.95-106; A. Das, Defending 
British India against Napoleon. The Foreign Policy of Governor-General Lord Minto, 1807-13 
(Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2016), pp.150-152.  
20 For an analysis of this discourse, see Crouzet, Genèses du Moyen-Orient, p.53; P. Risso, ‘Cross-Cultural 
Perceptions of Piracy: Maritime Violence in the Western Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf Region during a 
Long Eighteenth Century’, Journal of World History Vol. 12, No.2, (2001), p.293-319. Two sources are 
particularly important to understand this discourse: J. G. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and 
Central Arabia, 2 vol., (Calcutta: Government Printing, 1908-1915), C. R. Low, The History of the Indian 
Navy (1613-1863), 2 vol., (London: R. Bentley, 1877). 
21 On the pirate as a fluid legal construct, see L. Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in 
European Empires, 1400-1900 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp.112-120. 
22 L. Subramanian, The Sovereign and the Pirate: Ordering Maritime Subjects in India’s Western Littoral 
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2016); J. L. Anderson, ‘Piracy and World History: An Economic 
Perspective on Maritime Predation’ Journal of World History Vol. 6, No.2, (1995), pp.175-99. On the 
history of piracy as a symptom of the rivalries between imperial powers and thalassocracies in the Indian 
Ocean World, see Anne Pérotin-Dumon, ‘The Pirate and the Emperor: Power and the Law on the Seas, 
1450-1850’, in The Political Economy of Merchant Empires: State Power and World Trade 1350-1750, J. 
Tracy ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp.196-227. 
23 On discourses on race in India and beyond, see S. Kapila, ‘Race Matters: Orientalism and Religion, India 
and Beyond, c. 1770-1880’, Modern Asian Studies Vol. 41, No.3, (2007), pp.471-513. 
24 On this discourse in the nineteenth century, see for example, J. S. Buckingham, ‘The Pirate Coast was an 
ideal place for sea robbers’, Travels in Assyria, Media, and Persia, 2 vol., (London: Colburn & Bentley, 
1830), vol.1, p.210; J. R. Wellsted, ‘This plundering or piratical disposition is so general among the Arabs 
of these parts’, Travels to the City of the Caliphs, along the Shores of the Persian Gulf and the 
Mediterranean, Including a Voyage to the Coast of Arabia and Tour on the Island of Socotra, 2 vol., 
 19 
                                                                                                                                                        
(London: Henry Colburn, 1840), vol.1, p.99 ; ‘I question if any part of the globe presents a more tortuous 
or irregular outline than the north-east portion of Arabia’, Travels to the City, vol.1, p. 100. 
25 On this ‘piratical geography’, see S. Layton, ‘Discourses of Piracy in an Age of Revolutions’, Itinerario 
Vol.35, No.2 (2011), pp.81-97; Crouzet, Genèses du Moyen-Orient, p.78-80.  
26 On the Qasimi, see M. Al-Qasimi, The Myth of Arab Piracy in the Gulf (London: Croom Helm, 1986). 
For another point of view and defending the existence of piracy in the Gulf, see Kelly, Britain and the 
Persian Gulf. 
27 See for example Buckingham on the conversion of the Qasimi to Wahhabism: ‘They obeyed the call with 
all the enthusiasm which new religions are so frequently found to inspire, and directed their views to war 
and conquest; their leaders easily persuaded them that God was on their side, and that therefore the legions 
of hell itself could not prevail against them’, Buckingham, Travels in Assyria, vol.2, p.213. 
28 On this attack, see Crouzet, Genèses du Moyen-Orient, p.105. 
29 On discussions concerning the invention of the pirate myth, see ibid., pp.74-82; M. Al-Qasimi, M., The 
Myth; S. Layton, ‘Discourses’. 
30 On the discourse in Bombay on the Gulf pirates post 1800, see F. Warden, ‘Historical Sketch of the 
Joasmee Tribe of Arabs from the Year 1747 to the year 1819’, in R. Hughes Thomas (ed.), Selections from 
the Records of the Bombay Government, NS xxiv (Bombay: Bombay Education Society Press, 1856), 
pp.299-312. 
31 On these two interventions, see Crouzet, Genèses du Moyen-Orient, pp.113-114, 141-145. 
32 On the chronology of the Gulf mapping surveys, see Crouzet, Genèses du Moyen-Orient, pp.192-206. 
33 J.F. Standish, ‘British Maritime Policy in the Persian Gulf’, Middle Eastern Studies Vol.3, No. 4 (1964), 
pp.324-354. 
34 J. Onley, Arabian Frontier; J. Onley, ‘Britain’s Informal Empire in the Gulf, 1820–1971’, Journal of 
Social Affairs Vol.22, No. 87, (2005), pp.29-45. 
35 For an analysis of this discourse, see Crouzet, Genèses du Moyen-Orient, pp.79-86.   
36 IOR/R/15/1/14, f. 67, April 1814, Bruce to Farish. 
37 On the discussions around these preliminary treaties, IOR/R/15/1/21, ff 4-12, 16 January 1820, Keir to 
Bruce; IOR/R/15/1/21ff 21-26, 21 March 1820, Warden to Bruce. The preliminary treaties are reprinted in 
C. U. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads relating to India and Neighbouring 
Countries, Vol. 10, Containing the Treatises, Etc; Relating to Persia and the Persian Gulf (Calcutta: Office 
of the Superintendent of Government Printing, 1892). 
38 ‘Sultan bin Suggur shall surrender to the general towers, guns, and vessels which are in Sharjah, Imam, 
Umm-ool-Keiweyn and their dependencies’, Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, vol. 10, p.122. 
39 See article 7 of the General Treaty: ‘If any tribe, or others, shall not desist from plunder and piracy, the 
friendly Arabs shall act against them according to their ability and circumstances, and an arrangement for 
this purpose shall take place between the friendly Arabs and the British at the time when such plunder and 
piracy shall occur’, ibid., p.128. 
40 IOR/ R/15/1/14, f 77v, May 1814, Bruce to Warden. 
41 The treaty was thus designated as the ‘General Treaty with the Arab tribes’. 
42 See notably the treaty signed with the Sheikh of Ras al Khaimah: ‘Leave the boats which are for the pearl 
fishery and fishing boats, and the remainder of the vessels shall be at the disposal of the General’, 
Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, vol. 10, p.124. 
43 ‘The vessels of the friendly Arabs shall all of them have in their possession a paper (Register) signed 
with the signature of their chief, in which shall be the name of the vessel, its length, its breadth, and how 
many Karahs it holds. And they shall also have in their possession another writing (Port Clearance) signed 
with the signature of their chief, in which shall be the name of the owner, the name of the Nacodah, the 
number of men, the number of arms, from whence sailed, at what time, and to what port bound. And if a 
British or other vessel meet them, they shall produce the Register and the Clearance.’, Ibid, p.120. 
44IOR/R/15/1/27, ff 4v-6, Jan. 1823, MacLeod to Senior Officer commanding EIC vessels in the Gulf;  
IOR/F/4/1163/30468, ‘Papers regarding the political situation in the Persian Gulf, relations with local 
Chieftains, suppression of piracy’, 1827-1828; IOR/F/4/990/27718, ‘Papers regarding the political situation 
in the Persian Gulf, Muscat, Mocha, etc...’, vol. 5, Nov.1825-Aug.1826. 
45 IOR/R/15/1/67, f 62, Hennel to Norris, 1835. 
46 IOR/R/15/1/67, f19v, ‘List of demands to be made on the Chief of Aboothabee in compensation for the 
“outrages” committed by the Beniyas on the “peaceable Arabs” of the Persian Gulf’, 27 April 1835; IOR/ 
R/15/1/67, f 39v ‘General statement of the vessels detained or piratically seized by the Beniyas tribe and 
subsequently recovered by the Persian Gulf Squadron’, 21 May 1835. 
47 The Sheikhs of Abu Dhabi, of Dubai, of Ras al Khaimah, of Sharjah, of Umm al Quwain and of Ajman. 
 20 
                                                                                                                                                        
48 IOR/R/15/1/67, ff 85v-86, Dec. 1835. 
49 IOR/R/15/1/92, Brucks to Hennel, Nov. 1841. 
50 ‘From the 1st of June A. D. 1843 (...), there shall be a cessation of hostilities at sea between our 
respective subjects and dependants, and that from the above date until the termination of the month May A. 
D. 1853, an inviolable truce shall be established, during which period our several claims upon each other 
shall rest in abeyance.’ Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, p.134. 
51 ‘Being fully impressed with a sense of the evil consequence arising from our subjects and dependants 
being prevented carrying on the pearl fishery without interruption on the banks, owing to the various feuds 
existing amongst ourselves, and, moreover, duly appreciating the general advantage to be derived from the 
establishment of a truce’, Ibid, p.134. 
52 ‘That from this date, viz. 25th Rujjub 1269, 4th May 1853, and hereafter, there shall be a complete 
cessation of hostilities at sea between our respective subjects and dependants, and a perfect maritime truce 
shall endure between ourselves and between our successors, respectively, for evermore’, Ibid, p.136. 
53 Qatar was associated in 1916. On the exclusive treaties, see Onley, ‘Britain’s Informal Empire’; M. 
Yapp, ‘British Policy in the Persian Gulf” in The Persian Gulf States: A General Survey, Alvin J Cottrell 
(ed.), (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), pp.70-73; H. M. Albaharna, The Arabian 
Gulf States: Their Legal and Political Status and Their International Problems (Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 
1975).  
54 On this topic, see Z. Kurçun, The Ottomans in Qatar: A History of Anglo-Ottoman Conflicts in the 
Persian Gulf (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2002); F. Anscombe, The Ottoman Gulf: The Creation of Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia, and Qatar (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); J. Heller, British Policy Towards the 
Ottoman Empire, 1908–1914 (London: Frank Cass, 1983). 
55 Carter, Sea of Pearls, p.141-150. 
56 P. Bourdieu, La Distinction: Critique sociale du jugement (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1979), transl., 
R. Nice, , Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste, (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1984). 
57 L. Rosenthal, Mémoires d’un chercheur de perles (Paris: Deux Rives, 1949), transl. H. Briffault, The 
Pearl Hunter: An Autobiography (New York: Schuman, 1952). 
58 Carter, Sea of Pearls, chap. 4 and 5. 
59 On the connections between the Gulf pearl, the button and marquetry industries in France and England, 
see Crouzet, Genèses du Moyen-Orient, pp.384-5.  
60 J. G. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia, vol. 1 ‘Historical’, Part II, 
Appendix C ‘The Pearl and Mother-of-Pearl Fisheries of the Persian Gulf’, pp.2220-2293. 
61 The Ceylon fisheries were said to have been devastated by natural phenomena: IOR/L/PS/10/457, 
‘Report on the Ceylon pearl fisheries by Sir W. Crofton Twynam’, 1902. Fisheries in the Red Sea are also 
known to have experienced a crisis at the beginning of the twentieth century: ‘Report on the nature of red 
sea piracies from Jeddah Consul diary’, PRO/FO/78/5484, 1902, Devey to O’Connor. 
62 Donkin, Beyond Price. 
63 On these Indian merchant communities in the Gulf, involved in pearl fishing and trade, see C. Goswami, 
Globalization before its time: the Gujarati merchants from Kachchh (Gurgaon: Portfolio-Penguin, 2016), 
pp.72-115.  
64 With a few exceptions, the nakhoda is not to be confused with the owner of the boat.  
65 Goswami, Globalization. 
66 V. P. Hightower, ‘Pearling and Political Power in the Trucial States, 1850–1930: Debts, Taxes, and 
Politics’, Journal of Arabian Studies Vol. 3, No. 2, (2013), pp.215-23. 
67 IOR/R/15/1/185, ff 4, 2 Dec. 1878, Chief of Amulgavine and Chief of Ajman to British Agent in 
Sharjah. 
68 IOR/R/15/1/185, ff 82, 1878. 
69 E. C. Ross was resident in the Gulf from 1877 to 1891. 
70 IOR/R/15/1/185, ff. 117-118, 1879. The sheikh of Bahrain was not a signatory. 
71  On this global system of debt in the Indian Ocean, see F. Bishara, A Sea of Debt: Law and Economic 
Life in the Indian Ocean, 1850-1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), p.56. 
72 ‘In the event of a runaway seeking refuge in our territories, whether by sea or by land, to consider it our 
duty to at once, restore him to the chief from whose jurisdiction, he may have absconded’, IOR R/15/1/185, 
ff. 117-118, 1879. 
73 On S. Ettinghausen, see Crouzet, Genèses du Moyen-Orient, pp.389, 482; B. J. Slot, ‘French Relations 
with the Independent Shaikhdoms of the Lower Gulf’, Liwa, Journal of the National Center for 
Documentation & Research Vol. 1, No.2, (2009), p. 10-20. 
 21 
                                                                                                                                                        
74 On the history of the house of Rosenthal & Frères, see Rosenthal, Mémoires; Crouzet, Genèses du 
Moyen-Orient, pp.390-93, 495, 592; M. S. Hopper, ‘The African Presence in Eastern Arabia’, in The Gulf 
in Modern Times: People, Ports, and History (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2014), pp.202-213; M.S. 
Hopper, Slaves of One Master, pp.92-95, 193-194; Bose, A Hundred Horizons, p.86. 
75 IOR/R/15/1/710, ‘Administration report of the Persian Gulf Political Residency for the year 1909, 
Administration Report for Bahrein’, p.84. 
76 IOR/R/15/1/71, ‘Administration Report of the Persian Gulf Political Residency for the Years 1912, 
Administration Report for Bahrein’, p.102.  
77 IOR/R/15/2/14/B/3, ff 9-10, ‘Sponge and Pearl Concessions’, Cox to Political Agent in Bahrain, July 
1911. 
78 Hopper, Slaves of One Master, p. 95; Crouzet, Genèses du Moyen-Orient, p. 391. 
79 E. Staley, ‘Business and Politics in the Persian Gulf: The Story of the Wönckhaus Firm’, Political 
Science Quarterly, Vol. 48, No.3, (1993), pp.367-385; Crouzet, Genèses du Moyen-Orient, pp.343, 392-
395, 492. 
80 Lorimer, Gazetteer, p.2247 
81 IOR/L/PS/20/C247, ‘Précis of correspondence on international rivalry and British policy in the Persian 
Gulf, 1872-1905’, chapter 10 ‘Protection from foreign enterprise the rights of Arab tribes in the pearl 
fisheries of the Persian Gulf’, pp.304-333. 
82 IOR L/PS/20/C247, chapter 10. 
83 Lorimer, Gazetteer, p.2249 
84 C. Aitchison, The Treaties relating to Aden and the South Western Coast of Arabia, the Arab 
Principalities in the Persian Gulf, Muscat, Oman, Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier province, vol. 
XI, p.263. 
 85 Ibid, p.264. 
86 S. Beckert, Empire of Cotton. 
